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The Psychology of Dynamic Product Maintenance 
Abstract 
 
 The processes that underlie consumer decisions to invest in the maintenance of a 
durable good over time are examined.   The work centers on a hypotheses that consumers 
make decisions about whether to repair or replace a good that has suffered a decrease in 
performance through a process that assesses the value of repair actions relative to two 
points of reference: the normal rate at which the performance of goods declines as they 
age (age-indexing), and how the timing and cost of the repair compares to parallel norms 
for repair expenditures (expenditure indexing).  We show how these heuristics can be 
represented by a cognitive algebra that models maintenance decisions as a series of 
myopic utility-maximization problems.  This process yields outcomes that can 
approximate those that would emerge from an optimal dynamic maintenance policy in 
some cases, but significantly depart from optimality in others.  The algebra is then used 
to generate a series of predictions about how maintenance decisions may depart from 
normative benchmarks that are tested in a dynamic computer-pet ownership simulation.  
Actual maintenance behavior is characterized by a number of biases that are consistent 
with theoretical predictions, including a seemingly contradictory tendency to under-
maintain and prematurely replace goods of superior value when they were acquired, yet 
be overly reluctant to part with and over-maintain inferior goods. A discussion of the 
implications of the work for understanding real-world biases in product care and 
maintenance behavior is offered.  
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The idea there was that consumers would bring their broken electronic devices, such 
as television sets and VCR's, to the destruction centers, where trained personnel 
would whack them (the devices) with sledgehammers. With their devices thus 
permanently destroyed, consumers would then be free to go out and buy new devices, 
rather than have to fritter away years of their lives trying to have the old ones 
repaired at so-called "factory service centers," which in fact consist of two men 
named Lester poking at the insides of broken electronic devices with cheap cigars 
and going, "Lookit all them WIRES in there!" 
-Dave Barry, from "Mister Mediocre' Restaurants" 
Paying for the upkeep of durable goods is an expense in life that most of us would 
just as soon do without. While we all enjoy contemplating the prospect of acquiring new 
goods and technologies, we often forget that with their acquisition comes the burden of 
repair and maintenance—a stream of ongoing costs that can become quite sizable. In 
1997, for example, consumers in the United States spent over sixty-two billion dollars 
keeping their cars running, four billion cleaning them at car washes, nine billion repairing 
office machines and computers, three-hundred and fifty million repairing watches and 
jewelry, and over seven-billion dollars on dry cleaning1.  
Yet, as universal as these expenditures may be, they are also investment decisions 
that we are often remiss at making.  We drive cars with under-inflated tires, live in homes 
with clogged gutters and un-weeded gardens, and have teenagers whose rooms, well, may 
never see upkeep at all. On the other hand, one could also point to examples that seem to 
go the other way, instances where we seem to over-invest in maintenance.  Many of us 
have imposed draconian “no food in the car” rules during the early days of ownership, 
only to become lax in care a shortly thereafter, or found ourselves paying for the repair of 
an old appliance that we might have been better off simply replacing.  
What is the consumer decision process that leads to these varied—and possibly 
sub-optimal--behaviors?  Although the study of how consumers decide to acquire or 
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replace durable goods has long formed a central part of the literature of consumer 
decision making (see, e.g., Bayus 1991; Cripps and Meyer 1994; Pickering 1984; Winer 
1985), comparatively little attention has been given to a natural complement to this work, 
decisions about how much to invest in maintaining these goods once they have been 
acquired.  As a consequence, the efficiency of maintenance investments has remained 
largely a matter of speculation, and little theoretical guidance exists that might help 
influence how these decisions are made. 
The purpose of this research is to take a step toward closing this gap by reporting 
the results of an investigation into the processes that underlie consumer decisions to 
invest in the maintenance of a durable good.  The approach is both theoretical and 
empirical. We begin by advancing a hypothesis that consumers often overcome the 
computational difficulties associated with assessing the normative long-term costs and  
benefits of  maintenance strategies by utilizing two reference-point heuristics: comparing 
the how a good’s condition compares to that which would be typical its age (age 
indexing) and how an expenditure compares to that which would be typical in amount 
and timing  (expenditure indexing).   We then describe how these heuristics can be 
represented by a mathematical theory of dynamic maintenance.  The theory is one that 
yields outcomes that closely approximate normative theory in some contexts, yet predicts 
significant departures from optimality in others.  We conclude by examining degree to 
which the predictions of the theory are observed in a realistic dynamic product-ownership 
simulation where respondents care for a computerized “pet” over a multi-period horizon. 
The Psychology of Repair 
The normative principles of repair and replacement  
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 Consider the following problem: 
It is raining and you discover that your 10-year-old roof has a small leak above 
the attic.  You phone a contractor who informs you that you have three options: 
you could replace the roof for $10,000, patch the roof for $500, or put a bucket 
under the leak and defer the decision to later. You can afford any option and have 
no immediate plans to move.  Which of these options should you pursue?  
 
As routine as this problem might appear, it is not one that has a straightforward normative 
answer.  While mathematical methods for solving maintenance problems such as this 
forms one of the largest—and oldest—literatures in operations research management 
(see, e.g., Barlow and Hunter 1960; Chao-Ton 2000; Hayre, 1983; Usher, Ahmed, and  
Syed 1998; Zhang and Jardine 1998),  the advice it offers for how to derive optimal 
policies is rarely simple.    
To illustrate, consider what optimal-maintenance theory would say about how a 
homeowner should rationally decide what roof-repair action to undertake.  The 
homeowner would be presumed to seek a general policy for making maintenance 
decisions both now and in the future that maximizes expected net utility over a planning 
horizon—such as the duration of tenure in the home.  The best current action is that  
returned by this policy when applied to the current circumstances—a small leak above 
the attic with $0, $500, or $10,000 repair options. 
One of the central results of optimal maintenance theory is that if our homeowner  
can live with some simplifying assumptions about the dynamics of deterioration and 
repair—such as that the roof will deteriorate as a first-order Markov process and 
preferences are stationary over time--then the optimal policy can be described by a stable 
control-limit rule:  it is optimal to repair, replace, or do nothing to the roof depending on 
how its current condition and/or age compares to a set of critical threshold values (e.g.,  
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Barlow and  Hunter 1960; Assaf and Shanthikumar1987).  Armed with a bit of know-
how in stochastic-dynamic programming, solving for these optimal thresholds then 
becomes a matter of computation.  For example, a finite dynamic-programming 
algorithm would first derive the optimal threshold policy for some imagined terminal 
year (e.g., retirement) given all possible roof states, and then successively solve for the 
optimal thresholds for each early period assuming all subsequent decisions will be made 
optimally (e.g., Barlow and Hunter 1960). 
Where intuitive and optimal worlds depart: Elements of a descriptive theory of 
maintenance  
It is unlikely, of course, that consumers would make maintenance decisions in 
such a sophisticated manner.  Yet, casual observation suggests that the intuitive rules that 
we actually use to make these decisions may not be that different from those prescribed 
by normative theory, at least on the surface.  To illustrate, control-limit policies naturally 
arise in a wide range of actual maintenance tasks: we take our cars in for servicing when 
the mileage exceeds a manufacturer-suggested threshold, decide to paint the house if a 
certain number of years have elapsed since we last did so, and we have personal timing 
thresholds for knowing when it is time to update our wardrobes.2  Likewise, intuitive 
maintenance decisions often respond to changes in task attributes in the direction 
predicted by optimal theory.  Few people would see wisdom in taking a rental cars to a 
carwash just before they are turned in (a rational response to a change in ownership 
horizons), and most would be more likely to replace rather than repair a good if the price 
difference is small (a rational response to long-term cost differentials). 
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On the other hand, while consumers may have an intuitive awareness of the some 
of the structural properties of normative theory, it less likely that these intuitions would 
extend to their actual numerical calculation. Central to this work is a hypothesis that 
consumers overcome the cognitive difficulties associated with computing the long-term 
costs and benefits of different maintenance strategies by utilizing heuristics that 
benchmark considered maintenance against norms for:  
1) How condition of a goods typically degrade overtime in the course of 
ownership; and  
2) How investments in maintenance are typically scaled and paced over time.  
We will illustrate how these two classes of comparisons can guide—and possibly distort--
maintenance decisions in turn.  
Intuitive product life cycles.   How bad we feel when witnessing damage to a 
possession is often not just a function of the severity of the damage but also when the 
damage has occurred in the lifespan of ownership.  Most of us, for example, would likely 
feel a greater sense of trauma discovering a scratch on a brand-new car than one that had 
a few thousand miles on it (even when in the same starting condition), and greater 
distress getting a stain on a brand-new suit before we had a chance to wear it. Damage 
that occurs before a good has experienced a fair duration of use seems less forgivable 
than that which occurs later on, and—possibly--may yield a greater perceived benefit 
when repaired.  
Would there be a rational basis for such feelings? In some cases, of course, there 
is: one should feel worse about damage to a brand-new possession because its 
diminishing effects on utility will be felt over a longer time horizon of ownership.  But 
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similar product-age effects also arise in settings where ownership horizons would seem 
normatively irrelevant. To illustrate, we posed a sample of 87 business students with the 
following problem in furniture repair: 
Imagine that you have a well-paying job in New York where you recently moved 
into in a new apartment on the upper-west side. Just yesterday a mint-new white 
couch was delivered to your apartment that you purchased for $1500 from a 
furniture showroom in Soho.  Unfortunately, while eating breakfast you 
accidentally spill a glass of red juice on the new couch that causes a large, quite 
visible, stain.  The spill is particularly unfortunate since you are hosting a dinner 
party for some friends this evening who have never been to your apartment.  You 
call the show room and they suggested two remedies for cleaning the stain: 
1. They give you the name of a professional furniture restorer who, for 
$195, will immediately come to your house and restore the couch back 
to its  mint-new condition in time for the party; or    
2. For $30 you can clean it yourself using a mix of commercial cleansers 
in time for the party, accepting that the repair might be less than 
perfect.   
You expect that you will own the couch for at least five more years, and you can 
afford the higher-cost repair if needed. Which option would you choose? 
 
A separate group of 91 were given the same problem, but with the age described as being 
five-years old rather than brand new, but with all other features the same (it was in 
undamaged condition and would be owned for at least another five years) 
A decision-theoretic analysis of this problem would prescribe that a rational 
decision maker who finds it worthwhile to spend $195 for the more expensive repair in 
first scenario should find it no less worthwhile to do so in the second.  The reason is that 
while the age of the couch is different in the two scenarios, the benefits of the expensive 
repair are the same: the couch would be restored to a like-new condition for a five-year 
horizon of ownership.  Moreover, while it might well have imagined a greater level of 
liquidity in the second scenario, the effect would be to make the more expensive repair 
more rather than less attractive.  
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Did respondents behave in this way? In the aggregate they did not. In the case 
where the couch was brand-new, 62% of subjects preferred the expensive repair and 38% 
preferred the less-expensive option.  When the couch was described as being five years 
old, however, respondents were more evenly divided: only 44% opted for the expensive 
repair while 56% voted for the less expensive (χ2=5.85; p=.015).  
Two, closely related, explanations for the preference shift might be offered.  One 
is that respondents who were contemplating the first scenario saw the spill as distressing 
by virtue of it being premature vis-à-vis the typical pace of wear and tear on a couch. 
Specifically, while couches are bound to suffer spills at some point, this one occurred 
before the owner had a chance to extract such benefits as the ability to show it off to 
friends for the first time, and/or enjoying the smell of its new fabric—considerations that 
enhanced the perceived severity of the loss. Alternatively, the locus of the effect may 
have been at the other end; respondents faced with the second scenario may have seen 
little benefit in trying to restore a 5-year old couch to a level better (mint condition) than 
it would typically be for that age, regardless of the fact that the benefits of the repair 
would be consumed over the same time horizon.  
Intuitive expenditure patterns: the temporal disciplining of investments    
In the same way that perceptions of the disutility of product damage may be  
indexed by norms about product aging and wear, decisions about whether and when to 
invest in maintenance may also be influenced by expectations about how such 
expenditures are typically paced over time.  To illustrate, Cripps and Meyer (1994) report 
experimental evidence that individuals are reluctant incumbent goods with 
technologically superior new ones when the incumbent had just been purchased.  
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Likewise, Okada (2000) and Arkes (1996) report related survey evidence that when 
purchasing product replacements consumers are more responsive to promotions that 
allow them to trade in their existing good when it was acquired relatively recently (and is 
still functional), but monetarily-equivalent rebates given older goods whose functionality 
is perceived as having been exhausted.   
The most common explanation that has been offered for these findings is that they 
are a consequence of a tendency for consumers to mentally amortize both the benefits and 
costs of new goods over the course of their ownership (see, e.g., Prelec and Loewenstein 
1998; Gourville and Soman 1998; Okada 2000).  By this account, consumers will be  
averse to replacing a durable good that had just been purchased because it would require 
them to abandon a stream of benefits that had been paid for, yet not yet fully extracted.  
In other words, the good would be seen as having a “residual book value” that is mentally 
added to the price of the prospective replacement as a transaction cost (Okada 2000). 
 An extension of these ideas to consumer decisions about the timing of 
investments in repair would seem natural.  To illustrate, we posed a groups of 98 subjects 
the following variation of the couch problem described above: 
Imagine that you have a well-paying job in New York that allows you to live in a 
nice apartment on the upper-west side.  One of your favorite items of furniture is 
a designer couch that you purchased a couple of years ago that you keep in your 
living room.  About a year ago a guest accidentally spilled a glass of wine on the 
couch that caused a rather ugly stain, and you paid $150 to a professional 
furniture restoration company to restore it to like-new condition. Last night 
another accident occurred: this time you accidentally spilled a glass of tomato 
juice on the couch, leaving another stain. You consider three possible remedies: 
 
1. You could call the furniture restoration company back to restore the 
couch (for $150);   
2. You could try cleaning it yourself as best you can by experimenting 
with different commercial fabric cleansers for about $30, accepting 
that the repair may be something less than perfect; or 
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3. Do nothing for the time being, and worry about cleaning it later. 
You have no plans to fully replace the couch and you can afford the highest-cost 
option if desired. Which option would you choose? 
 
A second group of 97 subjects was then given the same problem, but with an important 
variation: the $150 repair was described as having been undertaken just one day—rather 
than one year—before the current spill. 
 If one can assume that the likelihood of future spills is the same in both scenarios 
(the overall frequency of historical spills is the same), optimal maintenance theory would 
predict that subjects respondents should reveal similar choices in both versions of the 
problem.  The initial $150 spent on repairs is a sunk cost that is normatively irrelevant to 
decisions about the second repair, regardless of whether it occurred a year later or a day 
later.   Yet, subjects were quite sensitive to this timing change. In the condition where the 
first of the two spills occurred a year ago, subjects were equally divided between  
choosing the more or less expensive repair (43% preferred each), with 13% opting for 
deferral.  When the accidents arose a day apart, however, there was a shift toward 
preferring the less-expensive repair for the second spill:  56% preferred the less 
expensive repair compared, 36% preferred the more expensive repair, and 5% deferred 
(overall χ2 (2)=5.54; p=.06). In essence, subjects acted as if there was an allowable 
budget for repairs that was renewed only when a sufficient period of time had elapsed 
since the first repair.  
 To test for the possibility that this result might have accrued to an imagined 
liquidity or wealth constraint, we posed a third group of 81 subjects with a variation of 
the 2-day scenario in which there was a much larger expenditure the day before—the 
original purchase of the couch for $1500 (paid by check).  In contrast to the above result, 
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here we see a return to indifference between the two repair investments: 50% chose the 
more expensive repair, 48% the cheaper repair, and 1% deferred.  As such, reduced 
liquidity does not seem to explain the reduced investment levels when the two spills 
occurred in close temporal proximity. 
Why did subjects respond so differently to newly-repaired goods versus newly-
purchased goods? One possible explanation is that the two kinds of expenditures were 
seen as being associated with quite separate mental amortization schedules.  In this case 
the fact that that $1500 had just been spent to purchase a couch appeared to be seen as 
irrelevant to the question of whether $150 or $30 should be spent to repair it.  In contrast, 
when a second spill occurred shortly after $150 had been spent on the same kind of 
expense (a repair), respondents acted is if the previous expenditure was now quite 
relevant. 
A Cognitive Algebra of Dynamic Maintenance  
Preliminaries  
In this section we describe formal descriptive model of consumer maintenance 
that attempts to offer a unified account of a range of normative and non-normative 
features of intuitive maintenance decisions such as those described above.  Within this 
framework both optimal and heuristic policies are shown to emerge as special cases of a 
more general dynamic decision process.  After developing the model’s structure we use it 
to derive a series of testable hypotheses about how actual maintenance behavior may 
depart from that prescribed by normative theory. 
To lend tractability to the exercise we focus on modeling how consumers resolve 
a particular class of maintenance problems that we will be studying empirically in the 
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next section.  Consider a risk-neutral consumer who wishes to consume the benefits of a 
class of durable goods that have a finite life expectancy E over a total time horizon T, 
E<T.  At an initial time point t=0 the consumer purchases one of these goods and 
observes its initial performance level, s0 , This level is a random draw from a known 
distribution G(s) of new-product quality levels (reflecting, for example, chance variations 
in the returns from new-product searches).  At each subsequent point in time the owner 
faces a constant hazard rate p that the good will suffer an accident that causes its 
performance level to decrease by some amount δ, where δ is a non-negative random draw 
from a known distribution F(δ).  Finally, p and F(δ) are chosen such that st>0 for all t; 
i.e., the good is never subject to complete failure prior to its age limit4  
Upon observing the state of the good (st) at each point in time the consumer is 
given the option to undertake one of three courses of action:  
1. Consume the good in its current condition and receive the utility st,   
2. Pay a repair fee cR= r(s0 – st) to restore the good to its initial condition, where 
r is a constant marginal cost of repair; or  
3. Pay a replacement fee cB= B, B>cR  to acquire a new good that would allow 
the consumer to receive the performance level s0*  where s0* is a new random 
draw from G(s).   If a replacement is purchased the forgone good is assumed 
to have no salvage value; that is, it is not sold or used in conjunction with the 
replacement. 
The consumer’s objective is to make a sequence of these decisions so as to maximize the  
total utility of ownership over the time horizon while minimizing total repair and 
replacement costs.  
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While this ownership problem is a potentially complex one, in Appendix One we 
show that it is associated with a comparatively straightforward—though not necessarily 
intuitive--optimal maintenance policy:  
1. On the initial trail, t=0, observe the quality of the initially-drawn good, s0. If s0 
is less than a threshold acquisition quality Q*, immediately pay cB for a 
replacement, and continue doing so until a good of quality Q* or higher is 
obtained; 
2. Once an acceptable good is acquired, proceed with its ownership for the 
duration of the life expectancy E, paying for the repair of all damages until a 
termination age of KD and none thereafter.  
But while the general form of the policy might be straightforward, the task of computing 
optimal control parameters Q* and KD is a difficult one that few decision makers could be 
expected to intuitively undertake. Our central hypothesis is that when faced with such a 
decision task individuals will not make maintenance decisions as above, but rather by a 
heuristic process that mimics some of its prescriptive properties.   Specifically, decision 
makers are posited to approach maintenance problems as a series of short-term utility-
maximization decisions that differentially encourage or dissuade maintenance actions 
based on how similar they are to those that optimal policies would typically prescribe, or 
that have been found to work in similar settings in the past.  The utility functions that 
describe this process exhibit two key properties:  
1) Age indexing of utility: the utility of a good in each period is assessed by a 
function that differentially motivates repair versus replacement depending on 
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how a good’s observed condition compares to that expected for a good of that 
age; and 
2) Temporal indexing of costs:  decisions about whether to invest in a 
maintenance action that would increase the utility of a good are based on a 
psychological cost function that compares the timing and magnitude of an 
expenditure to that typically expected over the life of a good. 
We develop these ideas more formally in two stages.  We first describe these 
properties in greater detail in the form of three behavioral axioms, and summarize the 
overall choice function that we hypothesize drives maintenance decisions. We then 
explore the implications of this model for likely empirical patterns of consumer 
maintenance behavior.  
The Behavioral Axioms  
1. Age Indexing   
A common normative prescription of optimal maintenance models is that as 
goods age they become more worthwhile to replace it than repair.  The reason is that 
goods are often made of wearable parts that have an inherent higher likelihood of failure 
with age (e.g., cars and washing machines), or are subject to obsolescence by the 
emergence of superior replacement goods (e.g., computers and fashion).  Yet, knowing 
the exact threshold point at which it becomes more worthwhile to replace than repair—if 
one exists at all--is not an easy computational problem to solve.5   
 We hypothesize that consumers overcome the complexity of such calculations by 
employing a general heuristic we term age indexing that is applied to all product 
ownership problems, even those where there is no mechanical aging of parts (such as the 
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current one).  Under age indexing consumers are assumed to assess the marginal disutility 
of a given observed unit of damage by comparing how the level of performance of results 
from that damage contrasts with that which would be typically expected from a good that 
has undergone a normal rate of wear.  We formalize this idea in terms of the following 
axiom: 
Axiom 1: the Age-Indexing of utility. Let s0 be the objective performance state of 
a good when it is first acquired, st be its observed state at time t, and At be the age 
of the good at t.  We hypothesize when assessing the attractiveness alternative 
maintenance actions at a given time t consumers asses the utility of consuming a 
good of age At in state st, u(st), by the reference-dependent process:                     
 ))(())(()( 02010 AHssukAHsukksu trot −++=   (1)    
 where H(A) is a monotonically decreasing aging function describing the 
consumer’s beliefs about the typical pace at which the utility conveyed by a good 
declines as it  ages, where H(0)=1, 0))(( =
∞→
AHLim
A
 (e.g., a negative exponential), 
and k0,k1,k2 are nonnegative scaling constants such that k0+k1+k2=1.  We assume 
that the marginal utility function for normal wear (uo(s0H(A)) is convex over 
s0H(A), and that for departures from the age-indexed state (ur(st –s0 H(A))  is 
asymmetric about is origin, being steeper in losses than gains6.  Hence,  initial 
decreases in utility from a good’s initial state are hypothesized to more salient 
than later ones, and the marginal displeasure of seeing a good age prematurely is 
assumed to  loom larger to  consumers than the pleasure of seeing it seeing it 
maintained in superior condition for its age.                                                                                            
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 Expression (1) describes an assessment process in which the utility that consumer 
associates with owning a good reflects a balancing of two age-dependent forces: 
1) A tendency to hold decreasing utility for goods as they age regardless of 
condition (the marginal utility function uo(s0H(A)); and 
2) A tendency for this base aging effect to be conditioned by how the 
actual condition of the good contrasts with that which would be typical 
for its age  (the marginal utility function ur(st- s0H(A)). 
The model provides a characterization of the age effects on judgment illustrated earlier: a 
constant unit of damage will be seen as having a greater disutility (hence be more likely 
to be repaired) if it is the first incident of damage to the good (by the convexity of 
uo(s0H(A))) and/or when  it is perceived as premature; i.e., results in a negative value of  
ur(st- s0H(A)) (by the asymmetry in slopes about the origin).  
While a key implication of expression (1) is that consumers will be increasingly 
indifferent to the loss of goods as they age, the expression also allows for the reverse to 
be true in special cases. Specifically, if a good is maintained in mint condition as it 
ages—such as an antique—expression (1) implies that its utility will be marked 
increasingly positive values of the contrast function ur(st- s0H(A)).  This, in turn, would 
imply that the sudden loss of such a good could invoke a sense of loss that is comparable 
or greater than that had it been brand new.7  
2. Temporal indexing of expenditures 
While age indexing describes the process by consumers assess the disutility of 
product damage, it does not characterize how consumer will decide to respond to these 
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assessments. We hypothesize that in the same way that consumers may use age indexing 
to assess the marginal disutility of damage to a good during the course of ownership,   
expenditure indexing is used to assess of the wisdom of a prospective investment in repair 
or replacement by contrasting its timing with that of the typical pace and magnitude of 
expenditures.   
The hypothesized process is as follows. When a consumer initially decides to 
invest in a good—being it to pay for a repair or purchase a replacement—this investment 
is accompanied by an implicit expectation about its duration; specifically, the length of 
time that will elapse until another such investment is required.   For example, when one 
pays for a plumbing repair there is an implicit expectation that it will hold up for some 
length of time, and new car purchases are usually accompanied by a belief about how 
long the car will be held before a new one will be bought.  Building on the mental 
amortization models of Okada (2000) and Gourville and Soman (1998), we hypothesize 
that these expectations serve to discipline the pattern of consumer spending over time by 
imposing psychic transaction costs that discourage investments that would be premature 
relative to timing norms.  
 We describe this idea through the following axiom:   
Axiom 2: The temporal indexing of costs.  Let  ktD  be the length of time that has 
elapsed since the consumer last  undertook maintenance action k for a currently-
owned good, Mk be the consumer’s expectation of the normal length of time 
between successive such investments.  For repairs, the duration RtD  would be 
either as the length of time since the last repair or, if a good has never suffered 
damage, its current age.   Although we do not explicitly model the evolution of 
 
 
18
beliefs about typical durations, Mk is assumed to reflect either externally-
established norms about durations (e.g., what Consumer Reports recommends for 
how often one should paint a house) or past experiences (the last interval between 
house paintings). We posit that when considering whether to undertake a 
maintenance action the consumer’s perception of its costliness is not just a 
function of the objective size of the expenditure, but also its temporal proximity to 
previous expenditures of the same type.   Formally, the psychological cost of 
action k, at time t, ψ(ckt) , is hypothesized to be given by the value function 
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where ktc  is the objective cost of action k at time t, 
k
Dtc −  is the size of the last 
investment in action k, and v1( ), v2( ), and v3( ) are positive monotone scaling 
functions with associated constants ki .  It is assumed that the difference function 
)(2
k
t
k DMv −  is asymmetric about its origin, positive and steeply sloping for Mk 
>Dkt  (the case of accelerated investments) and  slightly sloping for all Mk <Dkt  
(decelerated investments).  
Expression (2) describes a heuristic mechanism by which consumers discipline 
the temporal pacing of expenditures without engaging in explicit forward planning or 
dynamic reasoning.  The timing function )(2
k
t
k DMv − serves to make expenditures for 
a particular category seem psychologically more costly if the considered duration (Dkt) is 
much shorter than would the norm (Mk), and the historical expense function 
)/(3
k
t
k
Dt Dcv − serves to either temper or inflate this effect based on the size of the last  
investment.  That is, while accelerated expenditures (positive values of (Mk-Dkt)) will 
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inflate psychic costs, this effect will be diminished if the last expense was a trivial one, 
but amplified if it was large.  Expression (2) implies that consumers will be least prone to 
undertake those maintenance actions that were immediately preceded by a large 
investment of the same type (i.e., 0/; >>>> −−
k
Dt
k
Dt
k
t
k DcDM  ). 
Expression (2) exhibits two important properties.  First, while the core implication 
is a psychic penalty for accelerated maintenance expenditures, it also implies that 
consumers may be excessively prone to undertaking expenditures when the time since the 
last investment increases beyond what is normal (i.e., cases where Mk <Dkt). Hence, a 
consumer who has been fortunate to own an appliance that has remained trouble-free for 
a much longer period than would be predicted by (2) to be more prone than usual to pay 
for an expensive repair when the need finally arises. In essence, this delay acts as a kind 
of mental “savings” that is deducted from the perceived cost of the next similar 
maintenance (or replacement) action8.  
Second, note that the expression also allows a description of the temporal mental 
budgeting process that we illustrated earlier in which the psychological treatment of 
repair expenditures are treated quite differently from that of replacement expenditures.  
Specifically, in (4) the transaction penalty associated with a repair is a function solely of 
the timing and cost of the last repair—not the timing and cost of the last replacement.  
Hence, (2) predicts, ceteris paribus, that that a consumer would have the same adverse 
reaction to having to undertake a premature repair of a good that was purchased a year 
earlier compared to one that was purchased a few days earlier.   
3. The Maintenance Choice Process 
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 Given assessments of the marginal benefits and psychic costs of different 
maintenance actions (Axioms (1) and (2)), consumers are hypothesized to choose 
maintenance actions over time through a sequence of static (non-strategic) utility-
maximization decisions, Formally, at each point in time the consumer is hypothesized to 
observe the state of the good,  and decide whether to repair, replace, or accept it in that 
condition (defer) by choosing the option that offers the best prospective stream of utility 
as follows: 
Axiom 3: The choice axiom.  Let VDt VRt ,VBt  be the prospective values of 
deferral, repair, and replacement, respectively at time t, )( itsu  be marginal utility 
of consuming a good in state i  at time t as in expression (1) and )( ktcϕ  be the 
psychic cost of undertaking maintenance activity k at time t as in expression (2).  
In addition, let  f(β|q) be a (0,1) bounded function that describes the subjective 
rate of discounting for events q periods in the future,  Mk be the expected duration 
of activity k (as above), E be the finite life expectancy of the good, T the length of 
the total planning horizon, and  s*0 be the expected value of the performance a 
product replacement (as described above).   
 We posit that at each point in time the consumer chooses the maintenance 
action that satisfies the general maximization rule:                                           
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In the appendix we show that expression (3) can be derived as a reduced-form 
approximation to a normative maintenance policy that assumes that goods decay 
deterministically (by H(A)) for finite durations (Mk) under a high rate of mental 
discounting.  Behaviorally, it describes a choice process where consumers solve dynamic 
maintenance problems by comparing at each point thhree envisioned future utility 
streams:  
1) That restoring the good to its original performance level s0  for the cost 
cRt, and the consuming it under a normal aging rate (H(A)) for either the 
balance of the planning horizon  the expected duration of the repair; 
2) That of replacing the good with a new one that provides an expected 
performance level s0*  for the cost cBt, and consuming it under a normal 
aging rate for the expected time until the next replacement; or  
3) That of accepting current performance st for the current time period. 
Implications 
The normative policy for this problem characterizes maintenance as an all-or-
none-affair.  If one feels that one could obtain a better-performing good by purchasing a 
replacement, the optimal time to do so is at the immediate outset of ownership, when its 
benefits can be realized over the longest horizon.  Likewise, repairs should never be 
intermittent; if one is considering repairing a good one should do so either right away or 
never.   Would a consumer who makes decisions by the process summarized in 
expression (4) follow these principles? The answer is both yes and no.  On one hand, 
consistent with normative theory, (3) yields such straightforward predictions as:  
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R1: Consumers will be more likely to buy a replacement when initially endowed 
with of a low-valued good (s0 >E[s0*]); and 
R2: Be more reluctant to invest in both repairs and replacements given decreases 
in the anticipated horizon of amortization (the summation limit) and increases in 
the perceived cost of repair.  
On the other hand, the expression (3) also implies a number of likely systematic 
departures from normative theory.  We illustrate these in terms of four empirical 
hypotheses. 
Under-maintenance when vigilant care is optimal.   A key feature of the 
normative policy is if it is optimal for a consumer to invest in the maintenance if a good, 
the commitment to maintenance should be complete.  Hence, a rational consumer would 
never a good to deteriorate through several accidents before undertaking repair, or 
gradually withhold investments as it ages. Yet, application of expression (3) to a setting 
where repair is always optimal would not likely yield such vigilance.  By R1 above, as a 
consumer’s subjective rate of discounting increases relative to that assumed by a 
normative analysis (the consumer becomes increasingly myopic), the out-of-pocket costs 
of all repairs will loom increasingly large relative to doing nothing, discouraging 
investments in maintenance, Moreover, if the consumer holds a subjective aging function 
H(A) that is decreasing in A and/or approaches maintenance with a belief that 
replacement intervals are finite (MB<T), this under-maintenance bias will be exacerbated 
over time.  Specifically, increases in the slope of H(A) will decrease the marginal  
disutility associated with damage for older goods (by expression (1), Axiom 1) and 
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decreases in MB will shorten the imagined duration over which the benefits of repairs will 
be realized (by expression (2), Axiom 2).  Hence,  
H1:  Given ownership of goods for which normative theory prescribes vigilant 
maintenance, consumers will exhibit a global under-maintenance bias that is 
exacerbated as the good ages.   
 
Excessive ownership of and investment in low-valued goods.  Consider the 
converse case where a consumer is initially endowed with a low-valued good, formally, 
one whose quality is lower than that likely to be provided by a random replacement (s0 
<E[s0*]). As noted above, the optimal ownership strategy in this case is straightforward: 
one should immediately replace it with a new one, prior to any investments in 
maintenance.  There would, therefore, be no normative basis for an ownership strategy 
that holds the good for a period of time, invests in limited repairs, and then pays to 
acquire a replacement.       
Axioms 1 and 2, however, imply that such ownership behaviors, may, in fact, be 
commonplace. First, as above, Axiom 2 predicts that consumers will be reluctant to pay 
for purchases of replacement goods until the purchase cost of the incumbent has been at 
least somewhat mentally amortized.  In addition, Axiom 1 predicts a bias toward seeing 
an enhanced disutility for damage to all newly-acquired goods, something that would 
encourage investments in repair even for goods that will likely soon be replaced.  In sum, 
H2:  When endowed with an inferior good for which that normative theory 
prescribes immediate replacement, consumers will retain ownership longer than 
they should before undertaking replacement, and undertake positive investments 
in their maintenance..  
 
Exacerbation of the under-maintenance bias for the old and diminutive.   A 
consequence of the linearity in the cost and reward structure of the current problem is that 
the optimal maintenance policy is indifferent to both the quality (s0) of the currently-
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owned good as well as its age—up to optimal care-termination period.   The hypothesized 
decision process, however, implies that this principle may be frequently violated 
empirically.  First, it can be verified by inspection of expression (3) that the relative 
utility of a repair option VRt is predicted to be strictly decreasing in a good’s initial 
quality, and by the concavity of the normal aging function H(A) (expression 1) the 
relative utility of  repair versus deferral (VRt –VDt ) is also decreasing in s0.   Second, 
expression (3) also characterizes the increased aversion for investing in repairs as a good 
ages as arising gradually (through decreasing summation limits on the returns to repairs) 
rather than as a discrete step.  Hence, maintenance of goods will likely be gradually 
withdrawn earlier than would be prescribed by optimal theory, which, in turn, would 
encourage an earlier-than optimal replacement.  In summary,  
 H3:  The global tendency to under invest in maintenance when it is optimal will 
 be increasing in the age of a good and decreasing in the initial quality of the 
 good. 
 Temporal restrictions on spending: premature, delayed, and multiple 
damage effects.  Above we offered tentative survey support for two explicit predictions 
that emerge from Axioms 1 and 2: a diminished marginal likelihood of investing in 
repairs that are temporally proximate (by expenditure indexing), and a    
heightened likelihood in investing in the repair of damage to just-acquired (by age 
indexing).  We also noted, however, that the cost-indexing model (Axiom 2), also 
predicts a heightened enhanced likelihood of investing in the repair of goods for which 
the first incidents of damage are delayed, when the psychological cost of a repair is 
diminished by the absence of previous expenditures. More formally,     
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 H4.  The likelihood of investing repairs will be enhanced when damage is 
 perceived as either premature or highly delayed relative to normal wear rates, 
 and diminished when multiple damage events requiring independent investments 
 occur in close temporal proximity.  
Caveats: learning and the mechanism of damage  
 
 As currently formulated the theory says little about two aspects of maintenance 
behavior that may nevertheless prove empirically important: temporal changes in the 
form of assessment functions and the mechanism by which damage occurs. As 
formulated the model is structurally static, something that is unlikely to hold in practice 
over successive generations of consumer ownership of goods.  The most likely way that 
decision rules will evolve through experience, however, is far from clear.  On one hand, 
heuristics may evolve toward optimality over time as decision makers become more 
experienced in making maintenance decisions.  On the other hand, one might argue just 
the opposite: biases may be exacerbated by a tendency for beliefs about normal durations 
of ownership (MB) and aging rates (H(A)) to be self-fulfilling. Specifically, a consumer 
who begins ownership of a good with overly pessimistic beliefs about MB and H(A) will 
be discouraged from investing in maintenance to the level that would be prescribed by 
optimal theory. This under-maintenance bias, in turn, would translate to reduced 
expectations about ownership durations, which would, in turn, further reduce lower levels 
maintenance for the next good that is owned.   
Likewise, the nature of biases may also be sensitive to the mechanism by which 
decreases in performance through wear occur.  To illustrate, above we modeled product 
decay as a series of probabilistic decreases in the observed quality of the product that 
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occur with a constant hazard rate (p).  We might just as easily, however, modeled decay 
in as a series of increases in the hazard rate itself; a difference that may be critically 
psychologically if not mathematically.  
Because of the theoretical indeterminacy of these issues, we leave them as 
empirical issues to be explored in the experimental work below. Possible generalizations 
of the theory to account for their observed effects will be raised in the concluding 
discussion 
Empirical Analysis 
Overview and general procedure 
 In this section we describe a program of experimental work that examines the 
ability of the proposed theoretical structure to explain maintenance behavior in a realistic 
controlled setting.  The experiment posed a sample of subjects with the task of 
purchasing, owning, and maintaining a series of computerized electronic pets over a 
lengthy time horizon.9 This context and its implementation was the outgrowth of several 
generations of game design that utilized different approaches to manipulating product 
utility, the nature of experienced damage, and the mechanics of repair and replacement.  
Our central goal was to create a stimulus environment that would be seen by subjects as 
offering a reasonably realistic and involving portrait of how these variables manifest 
themselves in real-world settings, yet would be sufficiently abstract as to minimize the 
confounding effects of beliefs about product care and replacement policies that might be 
unique to the real world. 
The goal of the empirical work was twofold.  The first was to examine the degree 
to which subjects’ decisions about how much to invest in the maintenance of their 
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computer pets displayed departures from optimality consistent with hypotheses H1-H4 
above.  As such, we created experimental settings where the normative policy was to 
pursue either vigilantly maintenance of a good (for example, a case where repair costs are 
low relative to replacement costs and the performance of the current good is higher than 
that which could be expected from a replacements) or never pay to maintain it (the case 
where repair costs are high and/or the value of the current good is much lower than the 
expected value of replacements).  The second goal was to establish a body of empirical 
evidence on the two exploratory issues raised above: the dynamics of biases and 
variations in the mechanism of product decay.   
Subjects and Procedure 
One hundred-twenty-four graduate and undergraduate students volunteered to 
participate in return both for course credit and a monetary incentive.  Subjects were run in 
groups of five to twelve in a University computer laboratory over a two-week period, 
with the average session lasting forty minutes.  The monetary incentive took the form of 
four fifty-dollar cash prizes to the top four performing players. 
  Upon entering the lab subjects viewed a computer screen that provided the 
following overview of the task: 
“This game tests your skills in product ownership, where the stakes are real cash.  
For the next 30 minutes or so we want you to imagine that you live a world where 
people enjoy having as pets exotic electronic animals.  They are expensive toys—
they cost $500 each—but ownership brings lots of pleasure that make the 
purchase worthwhile. But there are few drawbacks with these pets.  First, they do 
not live forever; after they reach the age of 75(weeks) their batteries wear out and 
you have to go back to the store and buy a replacement.  Second, the amount of 
pleasure they provide varies from pet to pet and you only find out how much 
pleasure it provides after your purchase it.  Finally, they are rather fragile.  When 
you play with them they occasionally suffer accidents that lower the pleasure they 
deliver, and occasionally suffer illnesses that increases the frequency with which 
these accidents occur.  Both can be remedied, but these incur repair costs.” 
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The ownership game involved two recurrent phases that are illustrated in the 
sequence of screen captures in Appendix 3: a purchasing phase and an ownership phase. 
In the purchasing phase subjects were taken to a hypothetical “pet store” (Appendix 3, 
step 1) where they were asked to make a choice among three different cartoon images 
that depicted the appearance of the pets. After making a choice subjects were taken to a 
“training room” (Appendix 3, steps 2 ands 3) where the quality of the pet they just 
purchased was randomly determined by having the subject spin a series of computer 
wheels.  Subjects were told that the level of pleasure they derived from owning the pet 
(on a 100-point scale) was a function of the number of “tricks” it could be taught to 
perform, (e.g., playing cards), and the purpose of the spins was to discover this ability for 
their pet.  Each pet came with a starting pleasure level of 30, and for each successful 
training exercise their pet’s pleasure was enhanced by 10, to a maximum of 100. The 
purpose of this rather involved process for determining initial pleasure levels was to 
dramatize to subjects the chance nature of performance levels, emphasizing the difficulty 
of replacing pets with high levels or performance (cases where s0 >>E(s0*)), and the ease 
of those with low levels (cases where s0 <<E(s0*)).10 
 After acquiring a pet subjects began the main phase of the experiment (Appendix 
3, step 4), where, on each trial, subjects could accumulate pleasure points by clicking on 
a “play” button.  At the start of each round subjects were also informed if the pet had 
suffered one of two forms of maladies (Appendix 3, Step 5): 
1. An accident that dirties the pet, lowering its pleasure level from one to twelve 
points (a uniform random draw);  
2. and/or an illness that causes odds of such an accident to increase by 25%. 
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Upon initially acquiring each malady had a 12% of occurring on a given trial. This 12% 
rate remained constant through the task for incidents of illness, but could increase for 
rates of accidents if illnesses were left untreated, to a maximum of 50%.  Subjects were 
informed of the accident generating process at the start of the experiment, and were 
reminded throughout by being provided with information about the expected number of 
accidents they might expect for a pet of its age assuming that it was not ill, and, if the pet 
was sick, the updated probability of an accident. 
To remedy accidents and illnesses subjects could take their pet either to a 
“grooming salon” that would restore a pet’s original quality level or a “hospital” that 
would reduce the damage probability to the original .12 level.  The cost of the restoring a 
pet depended on how severely its condition had deteriorated from its new state.  For the 
case of cleaning, subjects were assigned to one of two marginal cost conditions designed 
to induce optimal policies that either favored or discouraged paying for such repairs.   In 
the low-cost condition subjects were charged $5 for every pleasure unit a pet had 
deteriorated from its new condition, and in the high-cost condition subjects were charged 
$40 per unit.  The cost for curing illnesses or restoring accident rates was constant in the 
experiment, and was defined by a two-tied structure mimicking that often associated with 
doctor visits.  Respondents were charged $25 to restore a pet that was mildly sick—
defined as having accident rates that had not grown to more than 50% of the initial (.12) 
level--and $100 if the pet was more severely ill.  Finally, at any point in the task 
respondents had the option of returning to the pet store and replacing their current pet 
with a new one, for a cost of $450.  There was no salvage value of a discarded pet.  
 
 
30
The total length of the game was 300 decision periods, with each pet having a 
maximum lifespan of 75 periods.  A finite life for each pet was introduced to allow 
investigation of whether maintenance policies evolved over successive generations of 
ownership of pets.       
Optimal play 
Above we noted that the optimal maintenance policy for this task will be that of a 
two-stage acquisition-threshold and repair-duration rule. In the experiment respondents 
were faced with two kinds of repair decisions in the task—those restoring increases in 
accident rates and those restoring quality losses—hence the optimal maintenance policy 
requires us to solve for two care-termination ages—one for accident rates (KS) and one 
for quality losses (KD).  We explored the solution surface for the control parameters Q*,  
KS,  KD  by numerically simulating 5000 plays of the of the game at each point over an 
exhaustive gradient of parameter values.  In Figure 1 we illustrate partial profiles of these 
analyses plotting measured earnings over a range of values of KS and  KD for the high- 
and low-cost conditions for when the optimal acquisition strategy is followed (Fig. 1a and 
1b), and a range of acquisition thresholds for when the optimal subsequent maintenance 
policy is followed (Fig. 1c).   
This analysis suggested the following point optimum ownership policy:  
1. On the initial trail, t=0, observe the quality of the initially-drawn good, s0. If s0 
is less than 80, immediately pay for a replacement, and continue doing so until a 
good of quality 80 or higher is obtained. 
2. Once an acceptable good is acquired, proceed with one of two repair strategies 
depending on the marginal cost of cleaning.  If the cost is low ($5) pay for the 
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repair of all increases in accident rates until a termination age of 70 and all 
decreases in pleasure points until a termination age of 35.  If the cost is high 
($40) pay for all increases accident rates until the age of 60, but never pay for 
cleaning.. 
 We should emphasize that this policy is quite robust to deviations from optimal 
control parameters, but only if a player intuitively grasps three core elements of the 
optimal solution: one should avoid setting to high a hurdle for initially accepting a pet, 
never pay for cleaning when the costs are high, and be vigilant about repairing increases 
in accident rates.  Once grasped, the optimal policy can be quite forgiving.  For example, 
as shown in Figure 1c, while expected earnings are maximized when one initially rejects 
all pets with qualities below 80, a decision maker who plays a more modest acceptance 
rule of Q*=60 can do almost as well realizing expected earnings that are within 6% of the 
optimum.  Likewise, when faced with low cleaning costs (Figure 1a) a player could err in 
setting the termination period for cleaning by as many as  20 periods and still realized 
earnings that are within 10% of the optimum. On the other hand, the policy is much less 
forgiving of players who fail to intuit the above core principles.  Players who retain a 
policy of vigilantly paying for cleaning in the high-cost condition after a pet reaches the 
age of 20, for example, will realize negative expected earnings, even given vigilant 
maintenance of accident rates (Figure 1b). 
Analysis and Results 
 Overall performance.  Over the course of 300 total periods of ownership the 124 
subjects in the low cleaning cost condition owned an average of 6.9 pets from which they 
realizing an average net performance score of 14167, while those in the high cleaning-
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cost condition owned an average of 8.4 pets from which they realized a net performance 
of  11964 . As a point of reference, a subject who followed the optimal policy would have 
been expected to have purchased an average of 6.72 pets over this same period in both 
conditions11, and realized a mean net performance of 16596 points in the low-cost 
condition and 13960 in the high cost.  Hence, the decision processes used by respondents 
yielded decisions that were not unskilled, revealing a level of achievement similar to that 
which would be attained by a range of policies that capture the gist—though not the 
precise details—of the optimum policy (Figure 1).  As a might be expected, there was 
considerable individual variation about these central values, with number of owned pets 
ranging from as few as four to as many as twenty, and realized earnings ranging from as 
little as 4789 points (in a high-cost condition, 34% of the optimum) to 21518 (in a low-
cost condition, 129% of the optimum).  The percentage of subjects who realized earnings 
that were below the expected optimum was 77% in the low cost condition and 74% in the 
high cost.  
 The discussion of the behaviors that formed the basis of this general result is 
organized in two phases: the character of decisions whether to pay for repairs given 
decreases in performance, and then the character of replacement decisions.  
Repair decisions 
 The normative policy prescribes that once a decision is made to own rather than 
immediately replace a pet, owners should repair virtually all illnesses that cause increase 
in its accident rate, but pay to repair decreases in quality: more sparingly: never when the 
cost is high, and during the first half of the pet’s life when the cost is low. The 
hypothesized evaluation process, however, predicts a more complex maintenance pattern: 
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a global tendency to under-maintain when vigilance is called for (H1), over-maintenance  
of  inferior goods that would be better replaced (H2), and a tendency for maintenance to 
gradually decline with a pet’s age and its initial quality (H3).  In addition, the proposed 
algebra also makes other, more detailed, predictions about maintenance behavior, such as 
tendency to be averse to paying for temporally-proximate repairs (H4).  
 In Figure 2 we plot the observed relative frequency with which respondents paid 
for the repair of a good given either an accident or illness by its proportional age, defined 
as its current chronological age relative to its realized maximum. We plot proportional 
age to control for individual differences in the length of time a given pet was owned—a 
duration, as noted above, that was almost alwasy shorter than the theoretical optimum.  
Figure 2a plots conditional maintenance rates over time by repair type (averaging over 
costs) , and 2b plots cleaning rates over time for the two cost levels.  
  The data provide a mixed view of the intuitive rationality of respondents in the 
task.  On one hand, congruent with normative theory, subjects were more consistently 
vigilant in paying to repair increases in accident rates (cures) than decreases in quality 
(cleans; Figure 2a), were less likely to pay for cleaning when the marginal costs were 
high (Figure 2b), and were less likely to paying for a repair as the terminal period of 
ownership approached.  Subjects’ implicit recognition of the greater importance of 
repairing increases in accident rates versus quality decreases is also notable in dispelling 
the suggestion above that subjects might be prone to overlooking repairs of damage that 
does not directly affect the utility drawn from a good, at least in this case.     
 On the other hand, the data also showed a number of systematic departures from 
optimality that was more supportive of the view of decision making provided by the 
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proposed algebra.  Strongly supporting H1, in cases where repair was optimal, 
conditional maintenance rates were far less the vigilance prescribed by the optimal 
policy.  Specifically, the mean conditional likelihood of repairing increases in the 
accident rate over the first 90% of each pet’s lifespan was 41%, while the mean 
likelihood of repairing a loss in quality when it was optimal ($5 repair cost, the first half 
of each lifespan) was 31.1%12.   In contrast, while it was not optimal to pay for cleaning 
in the high-cost condition, subjects over invested in maintenance.  In the $40 cost 
condition when no repairs should have been undertaken, there was nevertheless a 16.6% 
repair rate over all trials.  Finally, consistent with H3, subjects’ tendency to withdraw 
care as a pet aged was quite gradual, showing no clear evidence of the homogeneous 
termination point prescribed by optimal theory. 
 To explore the effect of pet quality on repair rates, in Figure 3 we plot histograms 
of the conditional probability of undertaking repairs given ownership of pets of each 
possible starting quality level.  Although normative theory prescribes that decision 
makers should be indifferent to starting quality levels in their maintenance decisions once 
a decision to assume ownership has been made, the data reject this, particularly for 
decisions to cure increases in accident rates (Figure 3a), and clean decreases in the 
quality given low cleaning costs (Figure 3b).  The starting-quality effect for cleaning 
decisions (3b), however, was not strictly monotonic: while subjects were more likely to 
invest in the maintenance of pets of quality 90 or 100 than those of lower quality, over 
the range of lower qualities the effect of starting quality vanishes, with the lowest-valued 
pets being given the same average level of care as those of intermediate quality.  
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A final focus of interest to is whether subjects’ maintenance behaviors followed 
the predictions of H4, that the under-maintenance bias will be exacerbated given 
multiple, temporally proximate repairs, and mollified when initial damage occurs either 
prematurely or is highly delayed.  To test the first of these propositions we computed the 
mean number of repairs undertaken for each kind of damage when they occurred in 
isolation versus jointly (that is, an illness and a dirt accident occurred on the same trial).  
Supporting H4, repair frequencies given joint events were sub-additive; the marginal 
likelihood of repairing an illness in isolation was .43 and that for a dirt accident in 
isolation was .27, but the mean number of repairs when both occurred at the same time 
was .56, implying that the joint incidence prompted an increased likelihood of repair, but 
often of just one rather than both maladies (F(illness x accident interaction; 1, 3128 df)= 
89.02, p<.001).  
To test the effect of timing of the first accident, in designing the experiment we 
randomly assigned one of the pets (never the first) acquired by subjects to a condition in 
which the first damage event (always a dirt accident) did not occur randomly but by a 
controlled schedule unknown to the respondent. There were three such timing levels: one 
where the first damage event occurred immediately on the 2nd ownership trial (slightly 
premature), one where it was delayed until the 10th trial (moderately delayed), and one 
where it was delayed until the 20th trial (highly delayed).  Because of the loss of 18 pets 
that were replaced in the first period of ownership, 106 pets were available for analysis, 
29 in the age 2 condition, 38 in the age 10, and 29 in the age 20.  It should be emphasized 
that while this analysis provides a strong test of the effect of highly delayed damage, it 
provides a weaker test of the predicted effects of pre-maturity. The odds that a pet would 
 
 
36
normally suffer some kind of damage on the first feasible trial was .226, a likelihood that 
may not have been sufficient to induce perceptions of rarity among subjects. In contrast, 
the odds of not seeing damage until the 20th trial was .002, a level much more likely to 
induce perceptions of rarity.    
Perhaps reflecting these different strengths of manipulation, the data gave partial 
support for the theoretical hypotheses. Consistent with predictions, subjects were more 
likely to pay for the repair of damage when it was highly delayed given the base rate.  
The  rate of cleaning when the first accident was delayed until the 20th period was .59 
compared to a mean rate of first repairs of .40 (χ2=2.99; p=.08).  In contrast, the data did 
not support a significant increase in repair rates when the first accident was slightly 
premature .41 v. .4 or moderately delayed .47 v. .4.  
  To provide a more systematic statistical investigation of the drivers of repair 
decisions we subjected subjects’ decisions about whether to pay for each form of product 
repair conditional on a given trial to binary logit analyses that modeled these decisions as 
a function of eight sets of explanatory variables:  
1) The original quality of the pet; 
2) The marginal cost of cleaning; 
3) Whether the pet became “dirty” on the trial (external wear); 
4) Whether the pet became “sick” on the trial (internal wear); 
5) The proportional age of the pet and its square;  
6) Proportional experience with pet ownership, defined as the pet number 
divided by the number of pets ultimately owned by the respondent; and 
7) Selected two-way interactions among variables (1) through (6). 
 
Experience with ownership was included in the analysis to allow us to detect possible 
learning effects in the task.  For example, one might conjecture that as experience with 
the task grew subjects may have developed an intuitive awareness of the optimality of 
cleaning in the low-cost condition but its sub-optimality in the high-cost condition.  Such 
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an effect would be manifested in a significant positive two-way interaction between 
experience and sickness incidents on cure rates and a significant negative three-way 
interaction among experience, sick rates, and repair costs for dirt accidents.  In this 
analysis we measure ownership experience using a proportional measure to control for 
individual differences in place-replacement frequencies.13 
 The results of the analysis are summarized in Table 1.  Supporting the visual 
findings reported above, the model reveals significant negative interactions between wear 
incidents and proportional age, implying a decreased conditional likelihood of 
maintenance as the age of a pet increased.  In addition, the data offer a mixed verdict for 
what subjects managed to learn about pet maintenance over the course of successive 
generations of ownership.  Supporting learning is the finding of a significant positive 
interaction between ownership experience (proportional pet number) and illness 
incidents, implying that subjects became more likely to invest in increased risks of 
probabilistic failures with ownership experience.  Likewise, we also observe this same 
positive interaction for responses to dirt incidents, but do not observe a significant 
negative conditioning three-way interaction with cleaning costs.  This implies that while 
subjects in the low-cost condition were appropriately learning to invest more in cleaning 
with increased ownership, subjects in the high-cost condition were inappropriately 
learning the same thing.  Finally, the analyses support the visual effect of starting quality 
on repair rates noted above (Figure 3): there is a significant positive interaction between 
incidents of illness and the linear trend in quality on cure rates (3a), but that between dirt 
incidents and linear quality on cleaning rates – while positive in sign—is insignificant 
(3b).     
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Replacement decisions  
Under the optimal policy the best strategy for maintaining lower-quality pets is 
never to assume ownership at all.  Specifically, if a pet is considered to of sufficiently 
low quality that one feels that investments in its maintenance are not worthwhile, or that 
one would be better off with a replacement, there is no normative advantage to delaying 
the replacement decision.  We hypothesized (H2), however, that subjects would be 
reluctant to immediately replace pets immediately after they have been acquired, 
regardless of how low their quality might be. 
 In Figure 4 we plot the frequency with which pets acquired in the first 225 weeks 
of the task immediately replaced, never replaced, or held for an intermediate duration 
pets of varying qualities. In cases where the ownership duration was between 1 and 75 
periods, we also report the median trial one which a voluntary replacement was made.  
On one hand, the figure offers evidence that subjects held at least a limited instinctual 
grasp of some aspects of the normative policy.  As would be optimal, the most common 
replacement action for pets of the lowest quality was to replace them immediately, while 
that for pets of quality 100 was to retain them for their maximum life (75 periods).  The 
larger sense of the data, however, is a strong rejection of the normative theory as a 
descriptive account of subjects’ replacement decisions.  While, indeed, 24% of all 
acquired pets of quality 30 were immediately replaced, 71% were not, and were held for 
a median duration of ownership of 19 periods.   Even more disturbing was the displayed 
willingness to replace pets of superior quality. In the 66 instances where subjects were 
fortunate enough to draw pets of quality 100, 43% were voluntarily replaced before they 
had lived their full lives, with a median ownership duration of 40 periods.  Respondents 
 
 
39
undertook these acts even though the odds that the new pet would be of the same quality 
was quite small (.16). 
 What drove the replacements of high-quality pets?  Within the proposed algebra it 
arises through a recursive process where norms of short ownership horizons discourage 
investments in maintenance, which, in turn, lead to degraded goods that enhance the 
appeal of replacements.  Consistent with this account, in Figure 5 we plot the average 
degree to which the original quality of pets had degraded at the time of replacement by 
starting quality level.  The figure reveals a remarkable empirical regularity: regardless of 
the initial quality of a pet, replacements arose when its quality was allowed to deteriorate 
to roughly 75% of its initial level (ranging from 71% to 78%).  Hence, as pets aged 
subjects appeared to view them as if they were undergoing unavoidable wear-out, even 
though in this task a repair investment would restore them to a like-new condition.  
 Finally, the data offered no evidence that the general bias of replacing pets 
prematurely diminished as subjects became more familiar with the process of pet 
ownership in simulation.  Among pets that were owned for at least 2 periods (i.e., 
eliminating immediate replacements), the data show no systematic lengthening of 
ownership over pets; the mean ownership durations over the first four such pets owned by 
respondents (excluding those held at the terminus of the simulation) were 32, 34, 33, and 
30 periods, respectively.  Because these means pool over pets of various qualities--some 
for which it was optimal to replace earlier—as a supplemental analysis we computed the 
percentage of pets of quality 70 or higher that were retained for a full 75 periods by 
ownership order.  While the percentage long-duration ownerships increased over the first 
three pets owned (from 12% to 21%), there was no continuation to the fourth, where 
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experience (and, for some, an approaching game terminus) would most favor long 
ownership: in this case the percentage dropped to 16%.  
Discussion 
Knowing how much to invest in the upkeep of durable goods is not an easy task.  
While there is a large literature in operations management that describes how one might 
derive analytic solutions to some of these problems, in practice we are more likely to rely 
on our intuitions or advice from others, such as that recently offered by a consumer web 
columnist:  
“While you can make decisions based on broad statistics such as the life 
expectancy of appliances and frequency of repair records, still, part of your 
decisions should be based on your personal preferences and “gut feeling”.  
Just because an appliance is nearing its average life doesn’t mean there isn’t a lot 
of spunk left in those coils and wires! But don’t get suck with a mean machine that 
eats paychecks for breakfast, either!” (Pat Veretto, About Frugal Living, 
frugalliving.about.com. 
  
What constitutes this “gut feeling”, and what is the quality of the decisions it yields?  The 
purpose of this research was to explore this issue by investigating the process by which 
consumers make dynamic decisions about the maintenance of a durable good.  The 
research centered on a hypothesis that consumers choose among maintenance actions by 
an assessment process that indexes the perceived benefits and costs of different 
maintenance actions by two dynamic benchmarks: how goods typically wear over time 
and how expenditures for repair and replacement are typically paced.  The process allows 
consumers to make maintenance decision that may often be not that different from those 
prescribed by optimal dynamic models, but without requiring the recursive reasoning and 
extended foresight required by such analyses.  
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 This hypothesis was represented within a formal algebraic theory of dynamic 
product care.  The purpose of this exercise was to show how a wide range of seemingly 
disparate consumer maintenance behaviors—including normative ones--can be explained 
within a common mathematical framework. To illustrate, at the outset we noted that 
while the stereotypic account of consumers is that we are lax in the care of many of our 
possessions, there are also instances where bias seems to go the other way—cases of 
seeming excessive attachment to older, deteriorated goods.  The proposed framework 
provides a means for explaining both tendencies by proposing that the utility that is 
drawn from goods in various conditions is assessed relative to beliefs about the expected 
condition of a good given its age.  In the early stages of ownership utility is 
monotonically declining as a good ages through normal wear-and-tear, but if it survives 
past the age of typical abandonment increasing age enhances utility.  As a result, 
consumers would be predicted to lament the loss of the very old and very new, but be 
comparatively indifferent to the loss of those in between.  
 We began the process of assessing the empirical validity of the theory by 
reporting the results of an experiment that examined the ability of a sample of 124 
subjects to learn to maintain a series of computer “pets” over a 300-period horizon.  The 
goal of the simulation was to investigate whether the major predicted departures from 
optimality would be evident in a reasonably realistic decision environment—one were 
respondents were faced with many of the same challenges that mark real product 
ownership, and where incentives were offered for performance.  For the most part the 
data supported the predicted departures from optimality: subjects under-invested in 
maintenance when it was optimal (H1), retained and invested in low-quality pets that 
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should have been immediately replaced (H2), displayed repair rates that gradually 
declined as a pet aged and were lower for pets of inferior quality (H3), were further 
deflated in the margin when multiple damage events occurred on the same trial (H4), but 
were more inclined to pay for the repair of damage that was highly delayed in its arrival 
(H4).   
Data from other task settings 
 One obvious limitation of the empirical work described here is that it provides a 
portrait of decision achievement in only one task setting.  For example, the pets owned by 
subjects had a deterministic lifespan (75 periods) and there was never a chance that it 
might fail completely due to poor maintenance.  In the real world, of course, neither 
circumstance usually holds: the lifespan of a possession is something that is usually under 
our control, and, for some goods (e.g., cars an computers) there is an ongoing risk of 
complete failure. 
 To examine the degree to which the findings reported here would generalize to 
such a setting, 189 new subjects participated in a new version of the simulation that 
imposed no limit on ownership duration (respondents could own a single pet for up to 
300 trials if desired), and, most significantly, the accident rate (p) in the task reported 
above was replaced by a failure probability.14  Specifically, all new and fully-repaired 
pets began life with a failure probability of zero, but this became increasingly positive 
when a pet suffered illnesses.  All other features of the task were the same as the current: 
the pet suffered probabilistic decreases in quality that could be repaired by cleaning 
(though here there was a constant accident rate), and the quality of a pet replacement was 
probabilistic. The normative policy here was simply a more extreme version of the 
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current one: the rational player should begin the simulation by immediately replacing pets 
until one with a quality of 90 or 100 is drawn, then vigilantly maintain it for the full 300 
periods of possible ownership (cleaning and repair costs were held constant).       
 The essential finding was that the biases of under-repair and over-replacement 
were not only replicated but amplified in this new task setting.  Over the 300 trials 
respondents owned an average of 11.97 pets (compared to a normative mean for this task 
of 2.7), held them for a median lifespan of 25 periods, and with the majority (63%) of 
terminations occurring due to probabilistic failure of an ill pet.  The number of owned 
pets ranged from as few as two to as many as 28, and life spans (again excluding 
immediate replacements) ranging from 2 to 198 periods.  To illustrate this effect in its 
most dramatic form, in the simulation there were 265 cases where subjects were endowed 
with quality=100 pets—cases where the value of vigilant maintenance should have been 
most transparent to subject (recall that replacement was never mandatory).  By age 30, 
however, less than half of these (128) were still actively owned, 22 having been 
voluntarily replaced, 95 suffering probabilistic failure, and 20 still living at the end of the 
simulation.  Among these age-30 survivors—who were comparatively well-maintained--
the average quality had deteriorated to a mean of 85.1, and had a median age of 29. 
Alternative theoretical accounts 
 One limitation of the proposed algebraic theory is that it has a restricted 
contextual focus, and considers only a subset of the psychological factors that may 
influence maintenance decisions over time.  A salient omission, for example, is learning.  
In the current formulation decision makers are assumed to hold beliefs about normal wear 
rates, normal maintenance requirements, and product –replacement intervals that are 
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invariant over a series of product-ownership cycles.  In real settings, of course, these 
beliefs are likely to ill-formed at the outset, evolve over time in light of decay rates that 
are actually observed, and thus be at least somewhat endogenous; maintenance policies 
are based on beliefs about product normal product wear rates, which are, in turn, formed 
by observing actual wear rates, which, in turn, are a function of past maintenance 
policies.  Given these complexities the problem of how to best model these psychological 
dynamics is set aside for the moment, but is resolution is essential for any complete 
understanding of real-world product-care behavior.  
 To illustrate the challenges modeling learning potentially poses, in the current 
experiment we found evidence that respondent’s attitudes toward the wisdom of investing 
in maintenance evolved over time, however it was not clearly in the direction of 
movement toward optimality in the task.  Specifically, with increased experience of 
ownership subjects displayed an increased propensity to invest in the repair of the pets 
they owned (a move toward optimality on average), but they did not display evidence of 
learning about either the wisdom of retaining pets for longer periods of time before 
replacement or when it is optimal not to pay for repairs.  Hence, it is possible that the 
increased tendency to invest in repairs with increased ownership experience did not 
accrue to learning but rather from other attitudinal dynamics, such as increased 
involvement with the simulation as it evolved (hence a desire to more fully utilize its 
available functions) . 
 Another caveat is that the theory provides only an explanation for the 
maintenance behavior observed in the experiment, and other processes may be at work.    
For example, one of the findings of the work that was supported for a prediction that 
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damage that occurs to goods that have survived in mint condition for long periods is more 
likely to be repaired than that whose arrival is more consistent with normal wear rates.  
The mechanism for this effect within the theory is that consumers have expectations for 
normal rates of spending for repairs, and funds that lie unspent for long periods 
eventually become reframed as if they were savings, reducing the psychic cost of repairs 
when they finally are needed (Axiom 2).  One might argue, however, that the result may 
have accrued to—or at least been amplified by—a more mundane explanation.  In this 
case may have taken the long delay in the need for repairs as evidence that the pet has a 
lower base accident rate than the norm, a belief that would rationally support more 
vigilant maintenance.     
Conclusions  
 One often hears the accusation that as consumers we under-invest in maintenance, 
yielding a society where disposal and replacement have become the norm, repair and 
frugal care the exception.  On the other hand, a case can be made that what might seem to 
under-maintenance is simply a rational response to the economic realities of modern 
markets; we replace rather than repair because new goods offer a higher benefit stream 
than repaired ones would, particularly given declining replacement costs.  
 Which one of these interpretations is right?  The verdict based on the research 
reported here is seem mixed.  On one hand, subjects in our simulation (as well as an 
extension) behaved in a way that would seem to support the popular accusation that 
consumers have a penchant for waste.  Respondents paid for repairs less often than they 
should have, and replaced their computer pets too often.  On the other hand, the real costs 
of these errors were comparatively small; while being demonstrably unaware of the 
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optimal policy that characterized the task, they made decisions that yielded an average 
performance score that was within 15% of the optimal expectation. 
 A natural question that arises in light of these findings is the degree to which they 
offer a model of the consumer behaviors we might expect to see in real-world settings. 
On the surface the answer would seem to be the affirmative. Real-world car ownership, 
for example, displays many of the same biases that arose in computerized pet ownership: 
car owners often fail to undertake small acts of maintenance that would reduce the long-
term costs of ownership (such as routinely checking tire pressure), and those who can 
afford it probably replace their cars more often than they really have to (though not as 
often as the auto industry might like).   On the other hand, whether the efficiency of real-
world decisions resemble that which was observed here is less clear.  The laboratory 
simulation offered an idealized environment where all the factors influencing product 
deterioration were known and there was frequent performance feedback—favorable 
factors that would not be present in real-world settings.  On the other hand, subjects did 
not have access to the kind of expert advice on maintenance that is routinely available in 
the real-world (e.g., a pet owner’s handbook)—a factor that may have limited 
performance relative to real-world contexts.  
 As a final comment, while the substantive focus of the current investigation on 
maintenance decisions is relatively new, the theoretical ideas it draws on should be seen 
as far more familiar. The idea that consumers may index their perceptions of the disutility 
of owning a deteriorated good by considering normal wear rates, for example, can be 
seen as simply extending the widely-documented tendency for assessments of utility to be 
reference dependent (e.g., Thaler 1980) to the dynamic case.  Likewise, the global bias of 
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under-maintenance follows from some of the same processes that underlie a range of 
better-documented biases in inter-temporal choice, such as an aversion for temporally 
accelerating payments for durable goods (e.g., Prelec and Lowenstein, 1998).  The work 
also illustrates, however, the theoretical and empirical challenges that arise when trying 
to extend these ideas to the study of decision making in complex multi-period settings.  
The task of deriving a theoretical framework that adequately integrates these ideas with 
notions of strategic planning is not an easy one, and the work reported here is advanced 
simply as a first step toward this goal. 
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Footnotes 
1Source: U.S. Census Bureau, 1997 Economic Census, NAICS 811 (Service Sector/Other 
Services/Repair and Maintenance) 
 
2As evidence of the pervasiveness of such ideas, a 2001 issue of Consumer Reports 
(October) published a large number set of age-dependent guidelines about when one 
should replace or repair a wide variety of durable goods. The magazine recommended, 
for example, that damaged computers should be replaced if they are over two years old, 
but damaged notebooks of the same age should be repaired.  
 
3This symmetry would hold, of course, if respondents took the large pervious repair 
expenditure as evidence of an enhanced attachment to the old good.   
 
4This assumption is introduced to preserve linearity over the utility space, a feature that 
eases computation of the normative policy.   
  
5In their October 2001 issue on repair advice Consumer Reports suggested a general 
“50% rule” for deciding whether to repair or replace an appliance: if the cost of repair is 
more than 50% the cost of replacement, replace the good.  The origin and normative 
status—if there is any--of this heuristic, however, is unknown. 
 
6Formally, u’o, u’’o >0, u’r>0; u’r(-x)> u’r(x). 
 
7To see this, note that as A→∞  the loss of a good that has been maintained in mint 
condition (i.e., st = s0 ) converges to - k2ur(s0) .  This value, in turn, would be similar to 
that suffered if the good was new (A=0), – k1uo(s0). If  k2  > k1, the loss of the older good 
would be perceived as greater. 
 
8One might recognize this effect as akin to a dieter who feels justified in rewarding 
himself with a second helping of a favorite food if he had been “extra good” on earlier 
days.  
 
9The task was inspired by the popular Japanese electronic-pets that first appeared in the 
late 1990’s, such as  Giga Pets and Tamagotchis.  In these games players try to keep key-
chain sized computerized pets alive for as long as possible through a regimen of care and 
feeding .      
 
10 The actual generating distribution was a hybrid uniform that made pets of the two 
extreme qualities (10 and 100) slightly more likely than those of intermediate quality, 
with respective likelihoods of .165 (simple uniform would be .12).  
 
11This number reflects the four pets that would be owned for a full 75 periods plus the 
number of immediate replacements expected under the optimal replacement rule.  
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12To verify that the normative predictions held for shorter anticipated life-spans, we 
repeated the numerical simulations reported earlier for cases of life-spans of 20, 30, and 
40 periods.  As before, the normative policy for repairing increases in accident rates was 
that was optimal to do so un until the 5th trial from the end, and optimal to pay for 
cleaning for up to the first half of trials.      
 
13 To illustrate the problem using raw pet number as a measure of experience, for subjects 
who replace pets frequently the 4th pet owned may have arisen quite early in his or her 
experience hence be reflective of limited experience, while for those who replaced rarely 
the 4th may have come late in the simulation after considerable experience.  In addition, 
we use pet ownership rather than simple time as a measure of experience to reflect the 
fact that within the course of ownership of a pet maintenance decisions tend to become 
routinized, and offer limited opportunities for learning.  
  
14A more complete summary of this experiment and the data are available from the author 
on request. 
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Table One 
Logistic Regression Analysis of Trial-By-Trial Repair Decisions 
   Clean Decisions   Cure Decisions 
Parameter   Estimate   P<χ2  Estimate   P<χ2  
 
Intercept  -4.897  <.0001  -5.087  <.0001  
Starting Quality(Q)    .004    .1813    -.001    .8554 
Sick (S)   2.118  <.0001   3.463   <.0001 
Dirty (D)   3.273  <.0001   1.961   <.0001 
Cleaning Cost (CC)   -.029  <.0001     -        -  
Relative Age (RA)     .013    .1099     .007    .3048 
Pet Experience (PE)   -.129    .5609    -.163    .4279 
Q*D       .005    .1553      -         - 
Q*S          -       .017    <.0001 
S*D     2.264  <.0001    2.089     <.0001  
D*CC       .006    .2900      -          -   
D*RA      -.031    .0019      -          -  
D*PE       .876    .0025      -          -   
D*PE*CC     -.003    .7088      -          -  
S*RA          -       -     -.057      <.0001  
S*PE          -       -      .504       .0369 
 
Model 
Likelihood Ratio  4293  <.0001      6394     <.0001  
Ρ2    .340        .439  
N    3762        3762  
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Figure 1: Simulated Performance of Alternative Threshold Maintenance Policies 
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1c: Acquisition Quality Thresholds Given Optimal Maintenance
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
3000
3500
4000
4500
30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Acceptance Quality Threshold
N
et
 P
er
fo
rm
an
ce
5$
40$
Cleaning
Costs
 
 
 
 
 
 
55
Figure 2: Empirical Repair Rates over Time 
2a. Repair rates by Type and Relative Age
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2c. Conditional Cleaning Probabilty by Relative Age and Marginal  Cost
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Figure 3 The Effect of Starting Quality on Repair Rates 
3a. Cure Rate by Starting Quality
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3b. Conditional Cleaning Probability by Cleaning Cost and Starting Quality
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Figure 4 
 
Frequency of Ownership Durations for Pets Acquired in Weeks 1-225, With Median 
Conditional Replacement Ages 
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Figure 5  
Percentage decay in quality at time of replacement by starting quality
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Appendix 1 
The Optimal Maintenance Policy 
 We consider the general from of the optimal control policy for a finite-horizon 
optimal maintenance policy that has the following structure.  At time t=0 a decision 
maker (DM) pays a purchase fee cB to acquire a good whose quality s0 is a random draw 
from a known distribution G(S).  On each subsequent occasion there is a constant known 
probability p that will cause the utility of the good to diminish by an amount δ that is a 
random draw from a distribution F(δ).  The expected utility of the good thus evolves as 
st=st-1-pE(δ), where by assumption 0)(lim >
→ tEt
s . On each occasion DM may pay a repair 
fee cR=r(s0-st) to restore the good to its initial quality level, purchase a new good for the 
price cB, or consume the good in its current state.  Each good has  finite life expectancy of 
E periods, and DM’s goal is to maximize net utility over an undiscounted T-period time 
horizon, T>E. 
 We show that the optimal maintenance policy is a control-limit rule of the form,  
1. On the initial trail, t=0, observe the quality of the initially-drawn good, s0. If s0 
is less than a threshold acquisition quality Q*, immediately pay cB for a 
replacement, and continue doing so until a good of quality Q* or higher is 
obtained; 
 
2. Once an acceptable good is acquired, proceed with its ownership for the 
duration of the life expectancy E, paying for the repair of all damages until a 
termination age of KD and none thereafter.  
 
Repair decisions 
 Consider a DM who entertains two policies at time t for repairing an expected 
series of decreases in quality over time,  E(st+N)=s0-NpE(δ): one that repairs each 
decrease δ as it arises (vigilant repair) versus one that repairs the good periodically, say 
just in period t+N.  Because the expected cost of implementing both policies is identical ( 
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r(s0-E(st+N)), it should be transparent that a policy of immediate will always dominates 
that for periodic or delayed repair by virtue of offering a superior benefit stream (Ns0 
versus (Ns0-∑ −=
1
1
)(N
i
ipE δ ).  The existence of a terminal care period follows 
immediately from this result.  If a decision maker concludes that it is not optimal to pay 
cR to restore a pet at t, it cannot be optimal to do so at any later period t+i.   For a given 
marginal repair cost, accident rate, accident magnitude, and expected ownership duration, 
the optimal repair policy will thus be that of a finite duration rule: the optimal decision 
maker will undertake all repairs as needed until a threshold time KD, and none thereafter. 
 We might add that because the decay parameters p and F(δ) are independent of 
the initial (or restored) quality of a good s0, the optimal control parameter  KD will also be 
independent of s0.  By invoking the optimal replacement policy (below) it follows that 
once one concludes that a good is worth owning, one should adopt the same posture 
toward repairing damage regardless of its initial quality.  
The optimal replacement policy 
 Whereas the repair policy holds for any undiscounted linear evolution of repair 
costs and benefits, the replacement policy is restricted to the case where p and F(δ) are 
such to insure that st>0 for all t<E; i.e., the good never completely fails before it reaches 
the end of its expected life expectancy.  With this in place the replacement policy follows  
using much the same line of argument above. A replacement offers only one advantage 
over a repaired incumbent: it provides the consumer with a chance to initiate a new 
stream of consumption utility with a good that has a higher base quality level than the 
current one, by paying for a new draw from the distribution of new-product qualities, 
G(s).  
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 Consider a consumer who owns a good of age  0<t<E that has an initial (restored) 
quality s0, and who concludes that it is worthwhile to pay cB>cR to replace a good at that 
time.  By the assumed stationarity of G(s) the single-period benefits of a replacement 
over a repair at t will be the same as they were at t-1.  The optimal age of replacement 
will thus be t=0 by backward induction.  By translation there will thus exist a critical 
control parameter Q*  that defines the quality at which a rational decision maker would 
be indifferent between accepting a good at the time of purchase and consuming it for E 
periods versus paying for another immediate replacement..  
General Comments 
 It is important to stress that this simple maintenance policy accrues to a number of 
problem simplifications that would not arise in more general maintenance problems, such 
a constant linear costs.  To illustrate, in the case where a good may deteriorate to an 
unusable condition before it reaches the maximum limit of its lifespan (E) and accident 
rates increase with chronological age, there will also exist an optimal replacement age 
less than E—a common feature of many optimal maintenance models.     
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Appendix 2 
Relation of the Choice Axiom to the Optimal Maintenance Policy  
The normative decision problem faced by the consumer is to find the set of 
control parameters Q* and KD in the optimal policy that, when applied to make a 
sequence of maintenance actions k over a time horizon, satisfy the recursive optimization 
criterion (Bellman’s equation):  
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* β                 (A1) 
where ts  is the state or condition of the good at time t, c
k
t is the cost of maintenance 
action k at t, )|( 1 ksp
p
t+  is the probability of  observing the good in state p at time t+1 
given that action k is take at t, and β is a temporal discount rate (β=1  in the actual reward 
structure) .   The hypothesized choice axiom can be derived as the special case of (A1) 
that arises if consumers are assumed to make two simplifying assumptions about how the 
performance of the good evolves over future time periods:  
1) Once a decision k is undertaken at time t no other action will be taken 
for Mk periods—i.e., the action has a finite expected duration; and 
2) The future performance of a good undergoes the deterministic aging 
process )|)((1 t
i
t
i
t ksAHs =+  as in expression (3). 
The key implication of these assumptions is that they allow (A1) to be re-written 
in the form 
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where the term  ∑
=
kM
q
tt AHksq
1
)]()|[(β  is the discounted future benefit of pursuing action k   
with expected duration Mk .  If we further assume that consumers utilize a hyperbolic 
subjective discount function f(β|t) that gives little consideration to future decisions 
beyond the duration of  repair and maintenance actions  (i.e., f(β|t)=0 for t> MR ,MB) ,  
(A1) further simplifies to  
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  If we let ),,()( 111
B
t
R
t
D
tD VVVMAXfk +++= β , ct=ψ(ct) be the subjective cost of action 
k as in equation (3), and vk( ) be an empirical scaling function, then (A3) can be written, 
for a finite planning horizon T,  
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where (A4) is now the hypothesized choice axiom.  
 Note that (A4) implies that the scaling constant in assessments of decisions to 
defer maintenance kD has a specific meaning in the context of a normative decision 
model: it is the expected value of facing a repair or replacement decision tomorrow rather 
than today; i.e., the psychological benefit of choice deferral.      
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Appendix 3 :Screen Shots of the Pet Ownership Simulation  
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